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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

CLAYTON BURNINGHAM,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 990582-CA

Priority No. 10

:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE CASE
Defendant appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence in the
State's prosecution of him for one count of possession of a controlled substance
(methamphetamine), a third-degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(Supp. 1999), one count of possession of a controlled substance (amphetamine), a thirddegree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), and one count of
possession of a controlled substance (marijuana), a class-B misdemeanor under Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 1999).

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Did an officer's request for a urine sample violate defendant's
Fourth Amendment rights, where officer had reasonable
suspicion that defendant, a probationer, was using drugs, and
where the search was reasonably related to the goals of
probation?

"We review the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress in a
bifurcated manner, reviewing its subsidiary and factual determinations under a clearly
erroneous standard and reviewing its legal conclusions for correctness." State v. Ribe.
876 P.2d 403, 405 (Utah App. 1994); see also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-40 (Utah
1994); State v. Thurman. 846 P.2d 1256, 1271 (Utah 1993). "Appellate courts . . . afford
the trial judge 'a measure of discretion9 in applying the reasonable articulable suspicion
standard to a particular set of facts." State v. Humphrey, 937 P.2d 137, 140 (Utah App.
1997) (quoting Pena. 869 P.2d at 939).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
U.S. Const amend. IV provides as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In 1996, defendant was charged with one count of possession of marijuana, a class
B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), and one count of
criminal mischief, a class A misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6106(2)(c)(iii)( 1999) (R. 88-89). He entered into a plea in abeyance for the marijuana
possession charge (R. 85-87). According to the plea-in-abeyance agreement, his guilty
plea would be held in abeyance for one year, and the charge would be dismissed upon his
satisfactory compliance with certain obligations (id.). Defendant agreed, among other
conditions, to refrain from the use of drugs, to obtain full-time employment or enroll in
school, and to
(g) Submit to searches of person and property for controlled substances at
the request of any law enforcement officer at any time upon request.
(R. 86). The one-year agreement was to take effect on "the date when this agreement is
approved by the court" (R. 85).
The trial court approved the plea-in abeyance agreement on September 19 ,1996
(R. 89-91). At the same time, the court accepted defendant's guilty plea to the criminal
mischief charge (R. 89). On the latter charge, the court suspended a one-year jail
sentence, and placed defendant on 15 months unsupervised probation (R. 90). As a
condition of probation, the court ordered
5.
That the Defendant shall submit to random tests of his breath
or urine, and shall submit to searches of his home, person, vehicle and any
other property under his control, at the request of any peace officer, without
the necessity of probable cause or a warrant.
3

(id.). The probationary period would expire by its terms on December 19, 1997.
On December 10, 1997, defendant was charged with the crimes at issue in this
case: one count of possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine), a seconddegree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), one count of
possession of a controlled substance (amphetamine), a third-degree felony under Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (Supp. 1999), and one count of possession of a controlled
substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i)
(Supp. 1999) (R. 1-2). The information was later amended to reduce the charge for
possession of methamphetamine to a third-degree felony (R. 26).
After a preliminary hearing, the trial court bound defendant over for trial (R. 5152). Defendant moved on October 22, 1998 to suppress evidence of his drug possession
(R. 57-62). The trial court denied the motion and entered written findings of fact and
conclusions of law (R. 122-28, Addendum A).
Defendant filed a petition for permission to file an interlocutory appeal on July 12,
1999 (R. 134). This Court granted the petition on August 11, 1999.

4

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Sometime in the fall of 1998, Garfield County Deputy Sheriff James Perkins
learned from a confidential informant that defendant had stashed a substantial amount of
methamphetamine and marijuana in a closet of the apartment defendant shared with his
brother and father at Panguitch Lake Resort (R. 138 at 10-11,13; 139 at 35). The drugs
were reportedly supplied to defendant by a person Deputy Perkins knew to have had
previous drug problems (R. 138 at 11).
Defendant had entered into a plea in abeyance the year before for a drug offense
(R. 85-87). In addition, he was on bench-supervised probation for criminal mischief (R.
90). Deputy Perkins knew that, under the terms of the probation, defendant was required
to submit to drug testing at the request of any peace officer (R. 138 at 10-11).
One of Deputy Perkins' duties as a law enforcement officer was conducting drug
tests of persons on probation (R. 139 at 49). He had performed more than 50 such tests
the previous year (R. 139 at 50).
Based on the information he had received about defendant's involvement with
drugs, Deputy Perkins decided to meet with defendant and request a urine sample (R. 139
at 49-50; R. 138 at 10-11). He and another officer went to the resort one evening in
October (R. 138 at 12). As he walked up to the door, Deputy Perkins could see

lr

The facts are taken primarily from transcripts of the preliminary hearing (R. 138
and 139).
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defendant through the window watching television (id.). The deputy knocked on the
door several times (id.). A dog barked on the other side, but no one answered the door
(id.). Deputy Perkins walked over to the window and looked inside (id). The lights and
TV had been turned off (id). The deputy knocked on the door again, but received no
reply (id). He could hear "what sounded like to me the dog being drug back across the
floor... claws or fingernails kind of scratching across the floor. Then the dog quit
barking" (id.). The officer said, "Come on Clay, open the door, I've already seen you" (R.
138 at 13). Nothing happened (id.). Deputy Perkins left (id).
The deputy returned to the resort the next day, and met defendant's brother Rick
Burningham (R. 139 at 37). Rick admitted the officer into the living quarters, and they
looked for drugs (R. 139 at 37-38). They found a film canister containing marijuana (R.
139 at 38).
Deputy Perkins came back to the lodge several more times and spoke to
defendant's father and brother, but neither seemed to know where defendant was (R. 138
at 13). The officer recalled, "my concerns grew that possibly . . . Clay was involved in
some activity that he shouldn't be, some illegal activity of some kind that he was using
drugs and didn't want to be tested" (id.). The officer also explained that "knowing that
the defendant had eluded me or avoided me

[t]hat made me very suspicious. I've had

a fairly decent relationship with the defendant and there was no other reason that I could
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think of that he could be avoiding me other than he was, possibly had been using some
illegal substances" (R. 139 at 43).
Deputy Perkins wrote a letter to defendant's then-attorney, who agreed to contact
defendant to arrange a drug test (R. 138 at 14). However, the drug test was apparently
never arranged.
On October 15, 1998, Deputy Perkins found defendant at a dwelling about a
quarter-mile from the lodge (id). Defendant met the officer at the door (R. 139 at 41).
At Deputy Perkins' request, defendant accompanied him to the deputy's vehicle (R.139 at
42). Deputy Perkins advised defendant of his Miranda rights, but did not arrest him or
tell him that he was not free to leave (id., R. 139 at 43,45). The officer told defendant he
suspected that defendant had been using drugs (R. 139 at 47). The officer then drove
defendant down to the lodge in search of a bathroom, not realizing that the water supply
to the lodge was turned off (R. 139 at 45).
When they stopped at the lodge, the officer repeated defendant's Miranda rights a
second time (R. 139 at 46). Then, he requested a urine sample (id.). The officer did not
tell defendant that defendant was required to submit to the test (R. 139 at 45-46).
Defendant admitted to the officer that he had smoked marijuana a couple of weeks
before (R. 138 at 15, R. 139 at 48). He agreed to be tested, and urinated into a sample
container the deputy provided (R. 138 at 14-15). As they sat in his patrol vehicle, Deputy
Perkins field-tested the sample (R. 138 at 15). Defendant's urine revealed the presence of

7

THC and methamphetamine (i(L). The officer told defendant of the test results, and, to
confirm the test's accuracy, conducted a second test (id.). That test, too, was positive
(14).
In his motion to suppress, defendant argued that the probation condition that he
submit to random searches of his person and property violated the Fourth Amendment (R.
80-81). He further maintained that Deputy Perkins used on the probation search
condition to evade the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement (R. 82-83).

The

trial court ruled that under State v. Ham. 910 P.2d 433,437-38 (Utah App. 1996), the
probation condition authorizing random searches of defendant was "illegal because it did
not require the defendant to give a sample of breath or urine to one acting with reasonable
suspicion" (R. 126, Addendum A). Nevertheless, the court held that the search was
lawful because the officer had reasonable suspicion (R. 127-28). In the court's words:
His suspicions were reasonable because he could articulate them
(namely, the officer told me about substances and the name of a person
[from whom defendant received the substances]) and he could articulate
their relationship to the defendant (namely, that defendant had the
substances and was associated with the person).
. . . The defendant avoided the officer, whose suspicions were
heightened.
In a week, the officer made personal contact with the defendant and
seized some of his urine. The defendant made voluntary, incriminating
statements.
(R. 127).

8

Responding to defendant's contentions that, in the court's words, "probation can
only be supervised by a probation officer, that a policeman is not a probation officer, and
that role-confusion is illegal," the court wrote, "Each of these contentions is rejected.
Bench (or, unsupervised) probation is specifically allowed by statute. The Judicial
Branch of government in Utah has no police or investigative officers and must rely on the
Executive Branch for these functions, which include the investigation of probation
violations" (R. 128).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Although defendant does not contest that Deputy Perkins had reasonable suspicion
that defendant had violated the terms of his bench probation, defendant maintains that the
deputy improperly evaded the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement when he
requested and received a sample of defendant's urine to conduct a drug test. Defendant
contends that only a probation officer is authorized to conduct a search of a probationer.
Defendant's argument does not acknowledge that defendant did not have a probation
supervisor, nor that the trial court depended on police officers to monitor defendant's
compliance with the terms of his probation. Probation in general, and bench probation in
particular, present "special needs" which justify departure from the usual requirement that
a search must be conducted pursuant to a warrant. Here, the search was supported by
reasonable suspicion and was reasonably related to the objectives of probation

9

supervision, namely, protection of the public and deterrence of wrongdoing. Therefore,
the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE OFFICER'S REQUEST THAT DEFENDANT
PROVIDE A URINE SAMPLE WAS (1) SUPPORTED BY
REASONABLE SUSPICION AND (2) REASONABLY RELATED
TO THE OBJECTIVES OF PROBATION SUPERVISION
Defendant argues that the officer impermissibly acted as a "stalking horse" when
he requested that defendant, a bench probationer, submit to a urinalysis. Appellant's
Brief at 8. Although he does not appear to dispute the trial court's conclusion that the
officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct the test, defendant apparently contends that
law enforcement officers are not authorized to conduct such searches of probationers
pursuant to court-ordered conditions of bench probation.2

2

Defendant argues that the search violated his rights under both the Fourth
Amendment and article I, section 14 of the Utah constitution. Since he has failed to
provide "independent authority, analysis, or argument" as to the state constitutional claim,
this Court should decline to reach it. State v. PizeL 987 P.2d 1288, 1289 n. 1 (Utah App.
1999); State v. Brandlev. 972 P.2d 78, 81 n.3 (Utah App. 1998); State v. Bean. 869 P.2d
984, 988-89 (Utah App. 1994).
Similarly, the last sentence of defendant's brief requests suppression of
defendant's self-incriminating statements. Appellant's Brief at 9. Defendant has failed to
address in his brief why, since the statements were made after defendant received two
Miranda warnings, suppression of the statements is an appropriate remedy.
Consequently, the claim is inadequately briefed and this Court should not consider it.
"Utah courts routinely decline to consider inadequately briefed arguments." State v.
Brvant. 965 P.2d 539, 549 (Utah App. 1998).
10

As a preliminary matter, defendant maintains in Point I of his brief that the
probation order's provision that defendant submit to vvlial ill I dant terms "search on
"iiltiiuii I1"'
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e search on the ground that, regardless o; uie

idt the random search provision w as illegal, this

case presents no real issue of whether probationers may lawfully be subjected to random
searches. For purposes
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L>cnvn i nmauuii i i events "Special .iwvia^ Necessitating that Lav*
Enforcement Officers Monitor Probation Compliance.
The U.S. Supreme Court has written that:
Although we usually require that a search be undertaken only pursuant to a
warrant (and thus supported by probable cause, as the Constitution says
warrants must be), we have permitted exceptions when "special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable cause requirement impracticable " "
\ State's operation of a
probation system
presents "special needs" beyond normal law
enforcement that may justify departures from the usual warrant and
probable-cause requirements."

Griffin v. Wisconsin, 481 11 S K6K, K71 -74 (19871 {<|\\ >iing New Jersey v. J .L.u., 111"' '
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U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackman, J. concurring in judgment) (other internal citation
omitted)).
Utah law specifically grants sentencing judges the discretion to place persons
convicted of criminal offenses on bench-supervised probation:
(2)(a) On a plea of guilty . . . or conviction of any crime or offense, the
court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence and place the
defendant on probation. The court may place the defendant:
(i) on probation under the supervision of the Department of Corrections
except in cases of class C misdemeanors or infractions;
(iii) on bench probation under the jurisdiction of the sentencing court.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1999).
In exercising its discretion to place a defendant on bench probation, the sentencing
court may be motivated by a number of factors. For example, the judge may believe that
the defendant requires a lesser degree of monitoring and supervision than a defendant
committed to the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections. Or, the judge may place
the defendant on bench-supervised probation in order to preserve the ability to personally
review the probationer's progress on a periodic basis. Regardless of the reason the court
chooses to place the defendant on bench probation, however, the court remains vested
with the power to impose reasonable probation conditions on a defendant convicted of a
crime. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-l(8)(a)(x) (1999) ("While on probation, and as a
condition of probation, the court may require that the defendant.. .comply with other
terms and conditions the court considers appropriate"). The court retains an interest, as
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B.

Police and Probation Officers May Collaborate in Probationer Searches.
Defendant suggests that a police officer may not conduct a warrantless search of a

>st

I
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the issue of whether, in the case of a probationer who is not supe

tlv addressed
y

,nc Dep

of Corrections, a law enforcement officer may conduct warrantless drug testing supported,
by reasonable suspicion 11 vever, recognizing llutl (he objectives oi law" enlurcen
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I

and probation supervision may overlap, the courts have approved reasonable-suspicion
searches conducted by police and probation or parole officials acting in collaboration. In
this case, the officer's motivation in conducting the search was consistent with both sets
of objectives. Therefore, the search was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized that probationers do not enjoy "'the
absolute liberty to which every citizen is entitled, but only . . . conditional liberty properly
dependent on observance of special [probation] restrictions.'" Griffin. 483 U.S. at 874
(1987) (quoting Morrissev v. Brewer. 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972). Probation represents
one point on a "continuum of possible punishments ranging from solitary confinement in
a maximum security facility to a few hours of mandatory community service." Id.
"[T]he importance of [probation] supervision has grown as probation has become an
increasingly common sentence for those convicted of serious crimes. Supervision, then,
is a 'special need' of the State permitting a degree of impingement upon privacy that
would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large." Id, at 875 (internal citation
omitted). In Griffin, the Court ruled that the warrant requirement is "impracticable" with
respect to probationers and approved a warrantless search of a probationer's residence
based on reasonable suspicion.3 Id. at 875-76.

3

"[R]easonable suspicion requires no more than that the authority acting be able to
point to specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational inferences from
those facts, reasonably warrant a belief in the conclusion mooted-in this instance, that a
condition of parole has been violated." Velasquez. 672 P.2d at 620 n. 5 (quoting U.S. v.
Scott. 678 F.2d 32, 35 (5th Cir. 1982)).
14
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reasonable suspicion that the parolee had committed a parole violation or a crime, and
that (2) the search must be "reasonably related to the pai ole officer" s dut> .' "' I d at 1260;

529-30 (Utah ^ pp 1998) The court rejected the defendant's claim on appeal that the
parole officers were merely acting as a tool of the police, ruling that "[a] parole officer's
search of aparolee , .. is not unlawful just because il i .ill

I in In i ill I llic police, or

criminal prosecution." I d at 1262.
The court followed the two-part test articulated in Velasquez in State v. Johnson,
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hat case... police inlonii I llli
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I<l Ii in Illiiiil s parole olticer

that they had a warrant for the defendant's arrest on forgery charges. Id at 1071. The
next day, a police officer and the parole officer went to Johnson's house, performed a
warrantless search, and arrested him. Id. As in Velasquez, the court rejected Johnson's
claim that the parole officer acted as the agent of the police:
[I]t is of no consequence that Officer Shepard [the parole officer] took no
action to search Johnson's quarters until Officer Jones [the police officer]
told Officer Shepard of the arrest warrant
Although we have warned
that police officers may not use parole officers simply as a means of
avoiding the warrant requirements to conduct random searches, that does
not mean that police officers and parole officers are precluded from
cooperating when the police have obtained an arrest warrant for the parolee.
. . . [T]here was no evidence of bad faith on the part of the police and the
parole officers. Consequently, there was nothing improper either in the
decision to conduct the warrantless search or in the joint effort between
Shepard and Jones.
Id at 1072-73.
This Court has similarly upheld the legality of warrantless probationer searches that
result from police-probation officer cooperation. In State v. Davis. 965 P.2d 525 (Utah
App. 1998), the Court held that a warrantless search of a probationer's residence by police
and probation officers was based upon reasonable suspicion and did not offend the Fourth
Amendment.4 Id. at 529-60. This Court also held that, under the second part of the test
articulated in Velasquez and Johnson, the search was reasonably related to the probation
officers' duties "to protect the public and prevent Davis from violating his probation." Id.

4

"This Court has noted that the reasonable suspicion standard applies to searches
of both probationers and parolees." Davis. 965 P.2d at 529 n.2 (citations omitted).
16

at 530-31.
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•fhe search was supported by reasonable suspicion, a fact

not challenge.

The officer had received an informant's tip that defendant had possession of a large
. quantity of drugs, and had found marijuana in the living quarters d

^r,Ai,^ -

• .;c

1
with whom he had pre\ IOUSIV had a "decent" relationship (R. 139 at 43). Those
"circumstances gave rise to the officer's reasonable suspicion that defendant had violated
his probation conditions and was involved in criminal activity.

because, under Davis, it was undertaken to "protect the public and pre vent [defendant]
from violating his probation," The fact that Deputy Perkins was not a probation, officer
assigned to supervise defendant's probation should not mak

5

i i ;he search

Although defendant cites cases from other jurisdictions, those cases do not control
this court. None of defendant's cases holds categorically that a law enforcement officer's
warrantless search of a probationer cannot, under the law of this state, reasonably relate to
the goals of probation. Furthermore, other courts have held that warrantless searches of
probationers by law enforcement (as opposed to probation) officers do not violate the
Fourth Amendment. See, &&, People v. Bravo, 738 P.2d 336, 336-37 (Cal. 1987); State
v. Perbix. 331 N.W.2d 14, 20 (N.D. 1983): Owens v. Kelley. 681 F.2d 1362,1369 (11th
Cir.1982); State v. Montgomery. 566 P.2d 1329,1331 (Ariz. 1977); State v. Sievers. 511
N.W.2d205.™7nsieh Ann 1 QQd): State v. Mitchell 207 S F ?d 2M ? 6 4 f N r Ann
1974)
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automatically suspect. As Velasquez, Johnson, and Davis demonstrate, once a probation
officer has developed reasonable suspicion that a probationer has violated his probation
broken the law, the officer may conduct an investigation of the wrongdoing in furtherance
of the officer's goal of protecting the public and deterring criminal conduct. Deputy
Perkins did no more.
Deputy Perkins had reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved with illegal
drugs - a clear violation of defendant's probation. He attempted unsuccessfully to arrange
the search through defendant's attorney (R. 138 at 14). He was careful to advise defendant
of his Miranda rights twice before requesting the urine sample (R. 138 at 43, 46). He did
not act arbitrarily or capriciously, and did not request the urine sample to harass or
intimidate defendant (see R. 138 at 14-15; 139 at 41-43, 45-48). The record indicates that
he did not pressure or coerce defendant into submitting to the test (see id.). Although he
admitted that the search furthered his investigation, he also stated that he asked for the
urine sample to monitor defendant's compliance with the conditions of his probation (R.
139 at 48-49). His goals in conducting the search did not differ from the goals a formallydesignated probation officer would have had in Officer Perkins' situation. He acted as a
probation officer would have acted under the circumstances.
Although defendant posits an arbitrary and artificial distinction between law
enforcement investigations and probation investigations, such a distinction is not
supported by the facts of this case. This was not an investigation unrelated to defendant's
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probation. I he "law em
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inveoii5cition in a cautious, reasonable manner, and did nut dtpoit hum the standai Jl1

f

conduct that would be expected of a formally-designated probation officer. Under the
circumstances presenl

l

" Lit, (lie otiicei s conduct mc '

et forth in Velasquez.
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CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm defendant's convictions.
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STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS

1.

1
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criminal conviction. He was also subject to the te
abeyance agreement, that required him to . *.

i

l
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an .*t,supervised plea in
T
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1•

Duri i IJJ 111 term of this plea in abeyance agreement, defendant shall
comply with the following obligations:... Submit to searches of person
and property for controlled substances at the request of any law
enforcement officer at any time upon request; and

2.

That the Defendant shall submit to ran :l : ;iri 11: 2 sts of his breath or urine, and
shall submit to searches of his home, person, vehicle and any other
property under his control, at the request of any peace officer, without the
necessity of probable cause or a warrant.
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2.

No probation officer was assigned to supervise the defendant.

3.

James D. Perkins, Jr. is a deputy sheriff of Garfield County, Utah. He knew about
the terms of defendant's probation and plea agreement.

4.

In or around the first week in October, 1997, Sgt. Perkins received information
from a confidential informant that the defendant was in possession of illegal
drugs, particularly methamphetamine and marijuana, and that the defendant was
involved with Terry Messer, a known drug user in Garfield County. Preliminary
Hearing Transcript, (hereinafter referred to as "PHT") at 10-11.

5.

Sgt. Perkins began looking for the defendant to request a urine sample for testing.

Id.
6.

On the night of October 7,1997, Sgt. Perkins went to the defendant's residence at
Panguitch Lake Resort to request a urine test. When he first arrived, Sgt. Perkins
looked through a window. He saw the defendant sitting and watching television.
However, when Sgt. Perkins knocked at the door, the television set and lights
went off, and though he knocked and shouted several times, the defendant did not
come to the door. PHT, at 12-13.

7.

Over the next week Sgt. Perkins continued to attempt to locate the defendant but
was unsuccessful. PHT, at 13-14.

8.

On October 15,1997, Sgt. Perkins was able to find the defendant at a cabin in the
9902171f«
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Panguitch Lake area. Sgt. Perkins read the defendant his Miranda warnings and
requested a urine sample. The defendant admitted he had been smoking
marijuana, and that the test would probably reveal that fact. PHT, at 9-10; 14-15.
9.

The defendant provided a sample of his urine. Sgt. Perkins field tested the urine
and the results indicated the presence of both THC, a metabolite of marijuana, and
methamphetamine. PHT, at 15.

10.

Sgt. Perkins preserved the urine sample and sent it to the Toxicology Laboratory
at the Utah Department of Health. The urine sample was tested at the Toxicology
Laboratory, and the results indicated 112 nanograms per milliliter of THC-COOH
Metabolite, 1.1 micrograms per milliliter of amphetamine, and 2 micrograms of
methamphetamine. PHT, at 15.
STATEMENT OF THE LAW

The law that applies to this scenario is found in both legislative enactments and injudicial
pronouncements. The legislative enactments are found in sections 77-18-1 and 77-2a-3, Utah
Code.
Law#l.

On a plea of guilty or no contest entered by a defendant in conjunction

with a plea in abeyance agreement, the court may hold the plea in abeyance as
provided in Title 77, Chapter 2a, Pleas in Abeyance, and under the terms of the
plea in abeyance agreement. Section 77-18-1(1), Utah Code.
9902171 ga
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On... conviction of any crime..., the court may suspend the imposition or

execution of sentence and place the defendant... on bench probation under the
jurisdiction of the sentencing court. Section 77-18-l(2)(a)(iii), Utah Code.
Law #3.

The legal custody of all probationers under the jurisdiction of the

sentencing court is vested as ordered by the court. The court has continuing
jurisdiction over all probationers. Section 77-18-l(2)(b)(ii), Utah Code.
Law #4.

While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant ...may

be required to ... comply with other terms and conditions the court considers
appropriate.... Section 77-18-l(8)(a)(x), Utah Code.
Law #5.

The court may upon acceptance of a plea in abeyance agreement and

pursuant to the terms of the agreement... order the defendant to comply with any
other conditions which could have been imposed as conditions of probation upon
conviction and sentencing for the same offense. Section 77-2a-3(5)(e), Utah Code.
Law #6.

Probationers do not enjoy the absolute liberty to which every citizen is

entitled, but only conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special
[probation] restrictions. Griffin v. Wisconsin. 483 US 868,97 L.Ed.2d 709,107
S.Ct. 3164 (United States Supreme Court, 1987).
Law #7.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution requires that a

probation officer have reasonable suspicion before commencing a warrantless
9902171j»
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search of a probationer's residence. State v Ham. 281 Utah Adv. Rep. 43,910
P.2d 433,1996 Utah App. LEXIS 6 (Case No. 950062-CA, COURT OF
APPEALS OF UTAH, 1996)
Law #8.

Even if defendant's probation agreement had not required reasonable

suspicion..., [t]his requirement is applicable regardless of the language contained
in defendant's probation agreement. State v. Ham, supra.

ANALYSIS
Defendant was on probation on October 1,1997. He was duty-bound to conform his
conduct to that of a law-abiding citizen, as all others are required to do, plus he was bound by
certain conditions of probation.
Those conditions of probation had been imposed by this Court, acting through the
undersigned as Judge. When the conditions were imposed, the Court intended to require the
defendant to give a sample of breath or urine at any time and for any reason, including no reason.
It now appears that the order imposing those conditions was illegal because it did not
require the defendant to give a sample of breath or urine to one acting with reasonable suspicion.
Because of Laws 7 and 8, it is incumbent on the court to interpret the probation order and the
plea-in-abeyance agreement as though they read:
1.

During the term of this plea in abeyance agreement, defendant shall
comply with the following obligations:... Submit to searches of person
and property for controlled substances at the request of any law
9902171.gi
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enforcement officer at any time upon request reasonable suspicion: and
2.

That the Defendant shall submit to random tests of his breath or urine, and
shall submit to searches of his home, person, vehicle and any other
property under his control, at the request of any peace officer, without the
necessity of probable cause or a warrant but only upon reasonable

suscirifln.
I will now attempt to interpret the order and agreement accordingly.
The analysis goes like this: Defendant was on probation. A policeman knew about the
probation and conditions thereof.
The policeman received a tip from a confidential informant about defendant. If the tip
were true, then defendant had (1) violated probation, and (2) committed a crime.
The policeman was suspicious of defendant. His suspicions were reasonable because he
could articulate them (namely, the officer told me about substances and the name of a person)
and he could articulate their relationship to the defendant (namely, that defendant had the
substances and was associated with the person).
The policeman found the defendant, but was unable to make personal contact with him.
The defendant avoided the officer, whose suspicions were heightened.
In a week, the officer made personal contact with the defendant and seized some of his
urine. The defendant made voluntary, incriminating statements.
The conclusion of this analysis is that the officer acted with reasonable suspicion.
The defendant has directed the Court's attention to a portion of a treatise by Professor
9902171 ga
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Wayne LaFave and to the Utah Supreme Court opinion of State v Johnson 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah
1987). I have read both, but am unconvinced of their analytical value in this situation. The
defendant uses them in an effort to convince the Court that probation can only be supervised by a
probation officer, that a policeman is not a probation officer, and that role-confusion is illegal.
Each of these contentions is rejected. Bench (or, unsupervised) probation is specifically
allowed by statute. The Judicial Branch of government in Utah has no police or investigative
officers and must rely on the Executive Branch for these functions, which include the
investigation of probation violations.
The motion to suppress should be denied. Mr. Lee is appointed to draft an appropriate
order and to submit it for execution by following the procedure set forth in Rule 4-504, Code of
Judicial Administration.
Dated this 3 o

day of February, 1999.

AM^
SXVItfL. MOWER
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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